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By decision of Parliament of 15 December 1975, the Committee on 
Budgets was consulted on Working Document No. 2 of the European council 
of 1 and 2 December 1975 on the budget and financing of the Community. 
It decided to deliver an opinion on those aspects relating to the 
role and function of parliamentary control of Community resources and 
expenditure dealt with in the above Working Document of the Council, 
and appointed Mr Cointat rapporteur at its meeting of 19 February 1976. 
It considered Mr Cointat's draft report and the problems in question 
at its meetings of 28 April, 12 and 19 May and 3 June 1976. 
At its meetings of 19 May and 3 June it adopted the motion for a 
resolution and explanatory statement by 11 votes in favour with 1 abstention. 
Present: Mr Lange, chairman: Mr Aigner, vice-chairman: Mr Cointat, 
rapporteur: Mr Artzinger, Lord Bruce of Donington, Mr Fletcher, Mr Frill, 
Mt Hansen, Mr Lautenschlager, Mr Memmel (deputizing for Mr Galli), Mr Mursch 
and Mr Yeats 
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A 
The Committee on Budgets hereby submits to the European Parliament 
the following motion for a resolution, together with explanatory statement: 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on the role and function of parliamentary control of Community resourcPs 
and expenditure 
The European Parliament, 
- having regard to its resolution of 27 June 19741 , and in particular 
paragraph 5 thereof, in which it reserved the right to: 
'add to the resolution in the light of the increased budgetary powers 
that the European Parliament expects to be granted as a result of the 
revision of the Treaty of 22 April 1970'; 
- having regard to the Treaty of 22 July 1975 amending certain financial 
prov,isions of the Treaties establishing the European Communities; 
- having regard to the outcome of the deliberations of the European 
Council of 1 and 2 December 1975; 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Budgets (Doc. 143/76) 
1. Stresses the complementary and inseparable nature of its responsibilities 
for authorizing and controlling co~unity resources and expenditure; 
2. Notes that Community control is organized and operates in a wholly 
unsatisfactory manner and that this causes serious difficulties; 
3. Likewise notes with regret that the Council's reluctance to draw up Community 
rules and methods of control is the main cause of the present difficulties; 
4. Considers that its control functions should: 
(a) be such as to avoid duplicating other forms of internal and external 
control but instead combine them with a view to drawing political 
conclusions, 
(b) cover on a permanent and retrospective basis all Community resources 
and expenditure, 
(c) make use of the close and permanent assistance of the Court of 
Auditors and the help of Community and national administrations, 
(d) be accompanied more frequently by sanctions under Article 92 of 
the Financial Regulation which provides that: 
'The institutions shall take all appropriate steps to take action on 
the comments appearing in the decisions giving discharge'. 
l OJ C 85, 18 July 1974, p. 22 
2 OJ L 116, 1 May 1973 
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5. Confirms: 
(a) its decision to set up - as from the beginning of the 1976/77 
session of Parliament - a sub-committee of the Committee on Budgets 
responsible for supervising expenditure; 
(b) that this sub-committee shall consist of 9 members (with named 
substitutes)and that the quorum necessary for deliberations shall 
be 3 members; 
6. Authorizes the sub-committee of the Committee on Budgets to publish if it 
thinks fit, the minutes and reports of its proceedings; 
7. Considers likewise that work connected with the control of the imple-
mentation of Parliament's budget will fall within the sub-committee's 
terms of reference. 
8. Also reaffirms that that sub-committee should be granted the powers of 
information and investigation referred to in paragraph 4 of the same 
resolution, i.e.: 
(a) the forwarding, both by the Community institutions and by the 
national authorities, of all documents relating to the implementation 
of Community expenditure; 
(b) the hearing of officials or experts from the Community institutions 
and Member States responsible for matters connected with the 
implementation of Community expenditure; 
(c) the carrying out of inspection visits to the Community institutions 
and national bodies whose activities are connected with the implemen-
tation of Community expenditure; 
9. Authorizes the Committee on Budgets and its sub-committee to contact the 
Council and Commission - as well as the Audit Board and later the future 
Court of Auditors - in order to consider the legal and practical problems 
of exercising such powers of control. 
10. Instructs the sub-committee to report to the Committee on Budgets and, 
with the assent of that committee, to Parliament; 
11. Considers it necessary to provide the sub-aommittee with further assis-
tance to enable it to discharge Parliament's additional control 
responsibilities. 
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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
Introduction 
1. At its meeting in Rome on 1 and 2 December 1975, the European Council 
devoted part of its proceedings to the Community's budgetary problems. 
On 15 December 1975, the President of the European Parliament in-
structed the Committee on Budgets to report on the problems of the control 
of expenditure and the Community's budgetary policy as discussed by the 
European Council. 
2. Although the European Council adopted no official text at the end of 
its proceedings, several documents have been distributed cmd one may assume 
that they reflect the views of the Heads of State or Government. 
3. One of these documents, on budgetary questions, states the following: 
'The European Council made a thorough study of the problems concerning 
control of Community expenditure and the Community's budgetary policy. 
(1) The Council agreed that more effective financial control of 
Community expenditure is needed and is in favour of early 
consideration being given to the suggestions put forward by 
the United Kingdom, German and Irish Heads of Government and 
to the Commission's proposals. 
(2) The President of the Council and the President of the Commission 
are asked to contact the President nf the Assembly to study the role 
that this Institution might play, by means of a committee or sub-
committee, in controlling Community expenditure. 
(3) The Heads of Government agreed to work towards a swift conclusion 
of the procedures for ratifying the Treaty establishing a European 
Court of Auditors, signed on 22 July last in Brussels, so that 
the Court may begin functioning in 1976. 
The European Council noted with satisfaction that indications 
given by the President of the Commission on the steps already 
taken to strengthen the powers of the Commissioner responsible 
for the budget, without prejudice to the collegiate responsibility 
of the Commission as laid down in the Treaties. 
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The European Council refers to the agreement reached at the Villa 
Marlia and formalized at the Council meeting of 5 and 6 November 
in Brussels on the annual convening of a joint session of Foreign 
Affairs Ministers and Finance Ministers to make an overall 
evaluation of Conununity budget problems. It is of the opinion 
that these discussions should cover c1cneral Conununity policy, 
ensure greater coordination between political and budgetary 
decisions and lead gradually to a multiannual estimation of 
expenditure to ensure better distribution of Conununity funds. 
Next year these discussions should be held in April, on the basis 
of a communication from the Conunission. 
The European Council noted the Conunission's intention to submit 
proposals to the Council on the application of the European unit 
of account to the Community budget.' 
4. It seems clear from this document that the European Council tackled 
budgetary questions from two different angles: 
- control of expenditure; 
- budgetary policy. 
Your rapporteur feels that each of these subjects deserves individual 
consideration and therefore proposes that two separate reports be drawn up; 
he also noted that the problem of control is of urgent concern to Parliament 
in view of the current reorganization of its relevant internal structures. 
He therefo~e proposes to give priority to this problem, and it alone 
is dealt with in this report. 
0 
0 0 
5. Of the three paragraphs of the Council's working document that deal 
with financial control, the second is of most interest to Parliament, since 
it refers to 'the role that Institution might play, by means of a committee 
or sub-committee, in controlling Community expenditure'. Your rapporteur 
has therefore focussed his attention on the problems - of principle as well 
as of material organization - of parliamentary financial control. He is 
aware, however, that the concept of control of Community expenditure calls 
for many other developments that the Committee on Budgets will undoubtedly 
want to discuss in detail on another occasion. 
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6. Before tackling the problem of parliamentary control, the anxiety 
expressed by the Heads of State or Government should be placed in its proper 
context and it should be remembered in particular that: 
- control of expenditure is merely one aspect of the Community's 
budgetary problems and that other questions are as important 
and as urgent; 
- although it is difficult to measure the exact extent of the 
control problems, they should not be dramatized; 
- the respective responsibilities of the institutions should be 
clearly differentiated. 
7 (a) It is essential thilt lhc implementation or Community c!xp011el.i.Lun• lll' 
strictly and effectively controlled, but it is er:sent i.,11 r.irst or <111 thill 
the budget should faithfully reflect the Community's financial requirements 
and also that it be adopted under a procedure that complies with democratic 
requirements. One cannot, however, be unaware of the grave inadequacies 
of the present budgetary system in the face of these two principles. The 
European Parliament, in its capacity of budgetary authority, feels that 
priority should be given to the problems of budgetary authorization and hopes 
that this point of view will be shared by the other institutions. It is in 
fact only in so far as the budgetary procedure enables Parliament correctly 
to assess the need for expenditure that a posteriori parliament control 
becomes, in its view, really meaningful. 
(b) There arc control difficultic~ at present, but it is difficult lo 
measure their extent since, so far, control has been only partial, sectoral 
or even non-existant. A fairly accurate idea can, however, be formed of 
the problems encountered in the agricultural sector: during the Commission's 
audit on the occasion of the Fourth EAGGF Financial Report, it emerged that 
irregularities noted in the EAGGF, Guarantee Section, from 1971 to 1974 
amounted on average to 0.15% of total appropriations allocated; a large 
part of these irregularities (64%) had already been recovered by 22 June 1975. 
It seems that these figures stand favourable comparison with the situation 
existing in a number of Member States. 
(c) Without going into the various reasons for these irregularities here, it 
seems clear that the Council itself is primarily responsible for this phenomenon; 
the bulk of Community appropriations are in fact spent by the 
Member States themselves and national administrations will have to cooperate 
with each other and with the Community institutions before there can be any 
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improvement in control. It should be noted, however, that the Council has 
shown evident reluctance in this field by not taking action on several 
Commission proposals and by even disputing the competence of the Community 
organs as regards customs cooperation. Moreover, the Council has obstinately 
refused to authorize the Audit Board to conduct the audit 'based on records 
and, if necessary, performed on the spot' in the Member States, for which 
it is responsible pursuant to Article 206 of the EEC Treaty. It is also a 
fact that the Commission's only proposals on those lines have been made under 
the Financial Regulation of 1 May 1973. 
0 
0 0 
8. After having placed these views of the European Council in their proper 
context and pointed out that the powers to authorize and control expenditure 
are linked and inseparable, it should be remembered that Parliament has 
always declared its willingness to assume greater responsibility for control. 
9. Its responsibilities have not however been increased until rc•ccntly: 
- until 1970, the Council alone granted the discharge and informed 
Parliament of its decision; 
- since 1970, the power to grant the discharge is held jointly by 
the two institutions; 
- the Treaty of 22 July 1975, which has not yet been ratified, will 
confer on Parliament alone the power to grant a discharge, on the 
recommendation of the Council. 
10. The Committee on Budgets has, from the beginning, been responsible for 
matters of control. On 11 April 1973, it set up two Sub-Committees: on the 
Budget of the Communities (Control of Implementation) and on the Budget of 
Parliament. Their role in controlling expenditure and the organization of 
their work were the subject of a resolution adopted by Parliament on 27 June 
1974 (rapporteur: Mr M. SCHMIDT) 1 . 
11. The first sub-committee, under the chairmanship of Miss FLESCH, met nine 
times between 1 July 1973 and 15 January 1975 and focussed its attention 
mainly on the following questions: 
- 1971 discharge, 
- European Court of Auditors, 
- enquiry into the Community Computer Centre. 
ll(a) The second sub-committee, under the chairmanship of Mr GERLACH, concerned 
itself with the drawing up of the European Parliament's estimates and the 
control of implementation. It met twelve times between 9 May 1973 and 21 
November 1974. It was not reconstituted in March 1975. 
1oJ No C 85, 18.7.1974 
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12. After the proceedings of the European Council in Rome had been 
referred to the Committee on Budgets, our committee discussed the matter 
on several occasions, mainly on the basis of a working document on the 
' ' I 1 
'proposed Community Accounts Committee 
13. The Committee's conclusions can be summarized as follows: 
- Parliament's resolution of 27 June 1974 remains the basis for 
the understanding and organization of parliamentary control of 
expenditure; 
- within this framework, the guidelines laid down in the working 
document quoted above1 have been taken into consideration; the work 
work of control should be resumed but entrusted to a sub-committee; 
- the sub-committee should be composed of nine members (and nine 
substitutes) and will be required to meet at regular and frequent 
intervals. 
14. The rapporteur has taken account of these conclusions in his 
report and has merely tried to provide more detailed information on 
certain questions connected with the definition of parliamentary control, 
its environment, the sanctions available to it, and its practical organi-
zation. 
I. Definition of control 
15. Parliamentary control of Community finances is part of a three-tier 
system in which it has a specific role commensurate with its proper nature. 
(a) T¥pes_of_Control 
16. The Community has three organs of control, the boundaries between which 
are often unclear. There are: 
t.he Financial Controller (internal control), who must approve in 
advance all revenue and expenditure; 
- the Audit Board which exercises external and retrospective control 
of the implementation of the budget and which should soon be replaced 
by the court of Auditors with much wider powers; 
- Parliament, responsible for external political control, whose 
powers of intervention are still to be defined; 
- Mention should also be made of the Commission's 'Special Committee 
of Enquiry' to examine the problem of irregularities in the manage-
ment of Community funds, particularly the EAGGF 2 
1 PE 43.433 and PE 43.433/Ann. - draftsman: Lord Bruce of Donington 
2 See Working document PE 41.708 of the Committee on Budgets (Rapporteur: 
Mr M. COINTAT) 
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17. As the Commission recently stated1 : 'These three forms of control 
must be reconciled and combined and not simply strung together, if we are 
to avoid the risk of seeing the monitoring of measures shackle measures 
themselves'. 
(b) S~cific_nature_of_Earliamentary_control 
18. Parliamentary control should be less technical (detection of frauds) 
and less of a book-keeping operation (checking that accounts are in order), 
but essentially political, in other words it must combine the other forms of 
control and draw the political conclusions. 
19. Since parliamentary control is political, there must be a guide to its 
objective, methods and permanence: 
1 Communication to the Joint Council of 5.4.76 (COM(76)83 final, p.28) 
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- parliamentary control is general, in other words it covers all Community 
1 
resources, and expenditure, whether they appear in the budget or not; 
it is concerned not only with the regularity of financial transactions 
but also with the need for them and the quality of management; 
- control is normally exercized through examination of revenue and 
expenditure accounts and the report of the Audit Board within the 
framework of the annual discharge decision; it may, however, be 
supplemented by more specific control measures relating to the 
financial implementation of various policies (consideration of the 
annual financial reports on the EAGGF, the Social Fund, etc.); it may 
even be still more ad hoe and deal with a particular sector or 
operation that has given rise to management problems or particularly 
serious irregularities (e.g. fraud in the milk sector, functioning 
of the computer centre): 
- such contol is retrospective and should not be subject to a U me-limit; 
it is, by its very nature, permanent. 'l'lii s means that i l covers the 
current financial year as well as previous financial years for which no 
discharge has yet been granted. It must not be exercised in advance, 
in other words before expenditure is incurred, since it would then 
become a form of advance authorization that is not provided for in 
Community texts; furthermore, it must not interfere with the daily 
management of funds, for which the Commission alone is responsible. 
II.The control environment 
20. If parliamentary control is to be exercised effectively, it must have 
the benefit of external assistance. In the Community, this assistance will 
be provided in the first place by the Court of Auditors, but also by the 
community's administrative bodies and the national administrations. 
21.(a)One of the tasks of the Court will be to 'assist the Assembly and 
the council in exercising their powers of control over the implementation 
of the budget'2. This assistance is to be of a permanent nature3 and should 
engender a particularly close relationship between the court of Auditors 
1To begin with, the control of resources will take the form of overall 
control, since on the one hand the budget of the Communities is not yet 
in practice entirely financed by all the own resources laid down in the 
Decision of 22 April 1970 and on the other hand a more systematic control 
of resources can only be applied gradually. 
2 Treaty of 22.7.1975: 
3 
new Article 206 (a) 
See the European Parliament's resolution of 27.6.1974 
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and the European Parliament, since by the terms of the Treaty of 22 July 1975 
Parliament will be responsible for giving the discharge. In view of this, 
it would be a pity if the new appellation of 'Court of Auditors' 
were to make that body's relations with the Parliament formal, or if its 
quasi-institutional status were to interpose itself as a barrier between 
the two. On the contrary, the effectiveness of parliamentary control would 
best be promoted by following the l\nglo-Saxon model, where the external 
control body's prime task is to assist Parliament in the exercise of its 
control, while fully maintaining its own independence. 
(b) In the resolution of the European Parliament1 referred to above 
it is stressed that Community administrative bodies and national 
administrations should render assistance to the parliamentary sub-
committee. It should be pointed out, however, that some uncertainty, 
both legal and political, attaches to this problem. For in fact there 
is no document which defines the exact obligations of the Commission 
towards Parliament in the area of financial control, nor clarifies 
questions such as the transmission of documents, intervi<"ws with and 
interrogation of officin.ls, the point at which offici,1ls' responsibility 
is engaged, etc. The situation is even more unclear with respect to the 
national administrations (summoning of officials, availability of files, 
on-the-spot checks, etc.) 
22. It should, nevertheless, be noted that the future Court of Auditors 
will have far-reaching powers of documentary and on-the-spot checks in 
respect of both community institutions and the Member States. Since the 
court of Auditors is to 'assist' the European Parliament in its control 
duties, Parliament could thereby indirectly have access to these instruments 
of control. such a situation does not, however, seem satisfactory, either 
in practical or in political terms, and the sub-committee will certainly 
wish to consider as a matter of priority these issues, which will largely 
determine the true scope of its control functions. 
III.control sanctions 
23. Parliamentary control, if it is to be really effective, must be 
backed by the power of sanction. Some of these sanctions may be of a 
negative type consisting, for instance, in a reproof to the Commission 
for a specific irregularity or instance of mismanagement - or they may 
be major political sanctions, such as refusal to give a discharge and 
the motion of censure. The usefulness of these negative sanctions seems 
rather slight, for they are either purely formal or far too severe. 
1see the resolution of the European Parliament of 27.6.1974 paragraph 4. 
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24. This is why it would be more appropriate to give preference 
to the positive sanction provided for under Article 92 of the 
Financial Regulation: 'The Institutions shall take all appropriate 
steps to take action on the comments appearing in the decisions giving 
discharge', for this provision in effect enables the sub-committee to 
oblige the Commission to set right any shortcomings discovered by the 
parliamentary body, and even to lay down by what means this should 
be done. 
25. Another form of 'sanction' could be represented by the publi-
cation of the sub-committee's proceedings. This is a reliable 
deterrent and it has been proposed in the working document referred to 
above1 : your rapporteur considers that the weapon of publicity should 
be employed by the sub-committee in certain circumstances and would 
advise that body to make a point of defining the conditions for its 
· use. 
IV. Practical organization of the control 
26. It will, of course, be up to the body concerned to organize 
its own work. Already at this stage, however, we can try to sketch 
out the likely framework of its activity. 
27. Evidently, this framework is determined by Parliament's 
resolution of 27 June 1974 and by its decision of 13 January 1976 on the 
establishment of a number of committees, as well as by the guide-
lines drafted by the Committee on Budgets, which were referred to in 
paragraph 13 above. 
28. It may therefore be assumed that Parliament's control will 
be exercised through a sub-committee of the Committee on Budgets, 
consisting of nine members plus nine substitutes, appointed ad 
personam. 
1 PE 43 .433 and Annex 
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29. without presuming to lay down precise and definite directives for 
the members of the sub-committee, we can try here to put together the 
main points concerning the duties of the sub-committee, the destination of 
its work, its relationship with the Court of Auditors, its working methods 
and the organization of its secretariat. 
(a) Duties of the sub-committee 
30. The sub-committee will, obviously, be concerned with all matters 
relating to financial control. It would not seem expedient to draw up 
an exhaustive list of the questions that will be referred to it, 
since they will be informally agreed with the Committee on Budgets. 
31. It should, nevertheless, be made clear that it will be the sub-
committee's task to oversee the implementation of the budgets of all the 
institutions, including Parliament. 
32. By way of indication, the main questions to be dealt with by the sub-
committee could be the following: 
- permanent control over all the Community's expenditure and resources: 
- preparation of the discharge to be given in respect of the implementation 
of budgets; 
- specialized financial reports. particularly on the EAGGF and the Social 
Fund: 
- quarterly reports on the implementation of the budget. 
(b) Destination of the work of the sub-committee 
33. It will suffice to recall here the provisions contained in Parliament's 
resolution of 27 June 1974: 
- the sub-committee shall normally report to the Committee on Budgets on 
the matters which have been referred to it, and more especially on 
all the 'raajor' reports which it will be its task regularly to prepare 
(the discharge, financial reports, etc.) 
- it is necessary, however, in urgent cases for the sub-committee to be 
able, with the approval of the Committee on Budgets, to report directly 
to Parliament. 
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34. It is c,lso important for the sub-committee to retain considerable 
freedom of initiative, i.e. to be able, as required by the needs of 
the moment, to take up any question relating to control - provided it 
reports to the Committee on Budgets. 
(c) Relationship with the Court of Auditors 
35. As stated in paragragh 21 above, it is important that a special 
relationship should exist between the Court of Auditors and the 
Parliament, and more particularly the latter's control sub-committee. 
36. Simil~rly, the sub-committee will play a part in 
the appointment of the members of the Court of Auditors within the 
framework of the consultation of Parliament on these appointments. 
37. The sub-committee will undoubtedly wish to make its co-operation 
with the Court of Auditors as official and permanent as possible. 
To this end, emulating the practice adopted in some Member States, it 
might, for instance, wish to invite the Court to delegate one of its 
members to each of the sub-committee's meetings. 
(d) Meetings 
38. It seems likely that the sub-committee will have to hold frequent 
and regular meetings.particularly i1t that period of the year when it 
is working on the discharge. 
(e) Secretariat 
39. It is evident that a sub-committee of such importance should have a 
large and competent secretariat permanently at its disposal. 
40. According to the working document already mentioned1 , an ad hoe 
control committee would need, in order to be fully operational, a 
secretariat composed of: 
-
5 new Category A officials; 
- 1 new category B official; 
- 5 new category C officials. 
The committee on Budgets has abandoned in part its proposals, well-
founded though they were, in favour of others which represent a strict 
minimum and for the most part do not necessitate the creation of new posts. 
1 PE 43.433 and Annex 
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These proposals will be given more detailed consideration and, as agreed 
by the Committee on Budgets, may lead in the light of initial experience 
to minimum req1ests for a strengthening of the present establishment 
plan of the secretariat of the Committee on Budgets when in nutumn 1976, 
Parliament considers the draft budget of the Communities for 1977. 
41. The Committee on Budgets and its sub-committee consider it 
essential to affirm at this stage: 
(a) the need for coordination between authorization and control 
matters and thus the need to maintain an integrated secretariat 
----------serving both the Committee on Budgets and the control sub-committee; 
(b) the need, in view of the burden of work, to strengthen this 
secretariat. 
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